DR. KALAM'S STATEMENT THAT INDIA CAN SCRAP THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT IS ONLY HALF THE TRUTH

Sher Agrawal

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[prohindu] Dr. Kalam's statement: "India can scrap nuclear deal anytime if warranted" hides painful clauses

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Krishan Bhatnagar Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 5:30 PM
Reply-To: prohindu-owner@yahoogroups.com
To: Undisclosed-Recipient

Letter to Members of Indian Parliament and Nationalists

Subject: India could pull out of the Agreement with the USA with heavy penalties, but will be bound with the agreement with the IAEA in perpetuity

Hon'ble Members of Parliament,

There is a news report that the former president Shri APJ Abdul Kalam has clarified to Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, supremo of the Samajwadi Party that "India can scrap nuclear deal anytime if warranted" (Attachment I). But there are heavy costs. The agreement with the UN (International Atomic Energy Agency) will stay, irrespective of whether India gets any nuclear reactors or nuclear fuel. Hence this statement by Dr. Kalam is only half the truth. In particular note should be taken of the fact that Dr. Kalam is only a space scientist and not a nuclear scientist.

We had sent a detailed letter clarifying this confusion on May 25 this year(see attachment II), discussing the whole issues elaborating our as well as public concerns as given below have not been addressed:

1) Indian experts were denied participation and information on this strategic deal in perpetuity, and the media gagged;
2) The Flawed Accord surrenders portion of Republic’s sovereignty and makes India subservient:
3) India urgently needs a more relevant nuclear deterrence policy:
4) Given India's security needs and hostile neighborhood India will need Nuclear Tests

5) India would be Bound by the Hyde Act ( A US national law) and International Inspections in Perpetuity:
6) The 'breadth of facilities' that India has decided to surrender to the so-called international safeguards is shocking as it includes 'fundamental physics and other research institutions'.
7) Staggering costs of mandated separation of civilian and defense nuclear facilities
8) It would be suicidal to accept a moratorium on nuclear research envisaged by the Indo-US Deal - to be sealed by the Accord with IAEA in perpetuity.

9) The Nuclear defense muscle, acquired laboriously and under severe sanctions must not be sacrificed:
10) Exorbitant costs of the Nuclear Deal : Public deserves to know why the coal powered electric plants that are widely used cannot be built or bought, preferably with clean air technology.
11) India still doesn’t have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence:

No nation can be a major power without three attributes: (a) a high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; (b) a capacity to meet basic defense needs indigenously; and (c) a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. With its strategic vision deficit compounded by a leadership deficit, India’s deficiencies in all the three areas are rather nearly alarming.



In this connection we suggest that nuclear scientists like Dr P.K. Iyengar, a former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission; Dr A. Gopala-krishnan, a former chairman of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board; and Dr A.N. Prasad, a former director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, be consulted. They have pleaded for Lifing veil on N-deal secrecy. With all due respect, we must state that Dr. Kalam is essentially a space scientist and space science has very little to do with nuclear science. Therefore, his ideas on the Deal are purely speculative. It would have served public interest better and looked more credible if he had publicly discussed the implications of the Hyde Act and 123 agreement and answered many questions raised by nuclear scientists and nuclear and strategic experts like Brahma Chellaney and Bharat Karnad..



Hence we request that the matter should not be rushed through and the American bipartisan system be emulated when all parties can openly discuss, and arrive at a conclusion that will be in country's best interests. Public and the Parliament must be fully involved in an issue that will bind them in perpetuity. We must reiterate that the statement "India can scrap nuclear deal anytime if warranted" is only half the truth which clouds the whole truth and hides the painful clauses.



Dr. Jagan Kaul
Krishan Bhatnagar
Forum for Secularism and Development (USA)
July 03, 2008

email: krishan.kb@verizon.net


=======================================================
Attachment I
Mulayam reveals his cards, says N-deal good

CNN-IBN; July 03,2008

New Delhi: Samajwadi Party (SP) supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav has come out strongly in support of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal.


Mulayam along with his party General Secretary Amar Singh met former president APJ Abdul Kalam in New Delhi on Thursday to discuss the nuclear deal and after coming out said, "Nuclear deal is in favour of the country."


"Kalam told us that the deal is in the interest of the nation and it is beneficial. Kalam explained to us the nuclear deal. Now we will decide what to do," Mulayam said.

The SP chief also added, "Without the interest of the nation, there is no politics."

"We will talk to UNPA and other leaders," Mulayam said.


Kalam also clarified that India can scrap nuclear deal anytime if warranted.


"Kalam suggest that country need clean energy. Without compromising any national interest we need uranium and deal is good and in favour of the country," Amar Singh said.


Amar Singh said that they consulted Kalam for almost one hour and discussed everything about the nuclear deal.


Kalam also said that the current nuclear reactors in the country were giving only 40 per cent output, which will increase after the deal is operationalised.


CNN-IBN National Affairs Editor Diptosh Majumdar reports that with the SP giving its nod to the nuclear deal, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government can breath easy as it is now assured of a majority support in Parliament over the deal.


The Left parties, which extend outside support to the UPA, have threatened to pullout if the government goes ahead with the deal.

http://www.ibnlive.com/news/nuclear-deal-is-good-for-the-country-mulayam/68246-3.html?xml

==============================================================

Attachmant II

Letter to Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, Parliamentarians and concerned Citizens

(May 25, 2008)



Subject: Indo-US Nuclear deal is extremely toxic to India’s Sovereignty, national security, defense and economic future. Once signed, Withdrawal from it will not alter conditionality of UN (IAEA) control on India’s nuclear domain: Indians could live without nuclear power for a while but becoming subservient to a super power could relegate it to a virtual “colony”





Hon'ble Dr. Kalam,

Hon'ble National leaders & Parliamentarians, and

Hon'ble Nationalist & Patriot citizens



When a former President, professionally a distinguished scientist who all along has been a champion of nation’s nuclear research and development and who very proudly and enthusiastically spearheaded the nation’s Pokhran II nuclear tests, reverses his position without assigning any scientific, strategic or technological grounds, it raises some serious and fundamental questions about the soundness and motives of his new stand. Recently such an earth shaking event unfolded when Dr. Kalam shocked the Indian nation and its scientific community by advising GOI to take the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, and thus accept terms and conditions that it imposes on the Indian Republic.

Dr. Kalam, who propelled India into the frontlines of space research and development opined, that "India should “go ahead” with the treaty as it does not compromise the country's sovereignty and that “we can at any time withdraw (from it)” (attachment A). On the basis of facts, Dr. Kalam is fundamentally wrong to make such farfetched assumptions. There are substantive arguments by many eminent experts as to why this deal amounts to death by stagnation for the Indian nuclear weapons program; down sizing of sovereignty, national security, highly prohibitive financial costs and enormous penalties for withdrawal and/or perceived violation of this International treaty which is cleverly peddled as a civil nuclear deal.




Whatever happens to the Indo-US Nuclear Deal the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, once concluded, will become functional and most of India’s dual-use nuclear energy programs will come permanently under IAEA’s and, indirectly, the US’ supervision. "Safeguards Agreement" is a diplomatically acceptable term for otherwise offensive and unacceptable 'international control'. Commitments with a UN body are of a permanent nature, irrespective of whether India gets nuclear fuel and reactors or not.



Withdrawal from the negotiations between the parties should not be a matter of embarrassment. The process of negotiations must be followed and weighed under the spirit of the July 18, 2005, joint statements made by President Bush and Premier Manmohan Singh. The intent and commitment in that statement that India will be treated at par with other advanced counties in the nuclear field such as the US, has already been seriously violated by the Bush Administration.



The US has a history of imposing terms and conditions upon others which she otherwise detests. For instance President Woodrow Wilson was the architect of the League of Nations, but the US didn't become its member. The US promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but the US Congress refused to ratify it. There are many more examples of countries going back on signed treaties. In the treaty under discussion the parties are only at a discussion stage and no one has signed any thing therefore, withdrawing from negotiations constitutes no violation unless the Indian authorities have already signed on some unrevealed terms.



1) Indian experts denied participation and information on this strategic deal in perpetuity, media gagged: In the US all three branches of the Govt. i.e., executive, legislative and judiciary have been actively involved in the preparation, examination and finalization of this Deal. On the Indian side however, it has been a few at the top of the executive branch who assumed all knowledge and authority to conduct all negotiations. Transparency, legal feasibility and Parliament’s advice, very fundamental processes in a democracy, were considered unnecessary. The billion plus Indians, nuclear experts, media, Parliament, Judiciary and Govt. agencies were denied the real contents and the text of the Deal even till today. It seemed like the good old Soviet times when only the privileged central actors of the politburo were trusted with the real facts.



Many Indian nuclear scientists of repute have been seriously concerned that 'Indo-US nuclear deal infringes on India’s independence' and wrote an open letter in support of their contention to Members of the Parliament, but were neglected by Govt. bent on accepting this unequal deal.

The otherwise independent media has generally remained loyal to the official version of the deal, seemingly influenced by Govt. and the pro-nuclear lobby. Mr. MJ Akbar and Ms. Seema Mustafa of the Asian Age, who in a balanced way presented the pros and cons of the N-deal, were recently removed, and the daily was gagged. Biased reporting and blind support of the official version by the media upholding the contention of the establishment is hardly healthy for a democratic polity that aims at people’s involvement in decision making.




2) The Flawed Accord surrenders portion of Republic’s sovereignty and makes India subservient: If New Delhi presses ahead with the deal, the poorly-negotiated 123 Agreement is going to come to haunt it. The outcome of the NSG deliberations would be influenced by the several conditions that GOI like a loyal subject has willingly embraced in that accord.

From the available indicators New Delhi seems to have agreed to : i) grant open-ended right to the supplier to suspend supplies forthwith simply by issuing a one-year termination notice; (ii) India has agreed to route not just spent fuel of US-origin but all "foreign nuclear material" through a new dedicated reprocessing facility that will take years to complete; (iii) instead of securing the right to reprocess upfront, India is to negotiate a separate agreement with the US on reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" after the new facility has been built;



Furthermore according to the “Deal” also known as 123 Agreement the following are other consequences India will face:



1) The future US cooperation with India will be governed under the provisions of the US National Laws, the Hyde Act included - allowing the US President access to information that will enable him to report back to the US Congress on different aspects, including the uranium mined and utilized, of India’s nuclear program.



2) The 123 Agreement imposes a “permanent ban” on India for conducting nuclear tests;

3) The Deal forces upon New Delhi the hitherto unacceptable CTBT regime which ironically even the US has refused to ratify;

4) This agreement recognizes the superior authority of the US President, US Congress, US Govt. Agencies, International Organizations, nuclear cartel etc upon India while reducing the Indian Republic to a subordinate and an inferior position.



5) India will have no case in the World Court should the US terminate this cooperation under any real or imaginary pretext;

6) The US will have right to seek the return of all nuclear items and materials and costs thereof;

7) The previously imposed embargo against India will remain in tact; Remaining under sanctions on fuel reprocessing, enrichment and production of heavy water for equipment and technologies

8) Under the direction of Washington India will work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to the so called third world;



9) India will not be allowed to build stockpiling that will help it to ride out any future sanctions and/or embargos;

10) The US will not compensate India for having unilaterally broken with impunity the accord of 1963;

11) India’s civilian nuclear establishment present and future among others will remain perpetually under the IAEA inspection regime; Requiring India to allow access to IAEA and US inspectors, with a potential for espionage and sabotage;

12) The Deal’s qualitative and quantitative checks would substantially limit the size and sophistication of India’s weapons programs;



13) The US retains veto power in permitting India reprocessing which it did not have in the agreement of 1963;

14) Capping of India’s production of fissile material;

15) Requiring India to follow a foreign policy "congruent" with the US of which the isolation of Iran is an integral part;

16) Joining the illegal Proliferation Security Initiative;



3) India urgently needs a more relevant nuclear deterrence policy: India has faced numerous aggressive surprises from Pakistan in Kashmir and also terrorist attacks. China has also made aggression upon India and annexed Aksai Chin, followed by the 1962 invasion. Now, over 45 years later, China has sprung another semi-strategic surprise by developing massive infrastructure along India’s northern borders, which enables Chinese military to carry out rapid deployment, putting India at a serious disadvantage. China is aware that India will need some 10 to 15 years to build comparable infrastructure. Further, New Delhi is handicapped by its "no first use" policy with respect to nuclear weapons.

China has, reportedly, stepped up incursions along India’s northern borders, with the aim of pressuring her to make major concessions to resolve the boundary dispute on China’s terms. By repeatedly claiming Tawang - which it occupied and vacated in 1962 - China has gone back on an earlier agreement that the boundary dispute resolution would not involve exchange of any populated territory. China also has a clear "string of pearls" policy, whereby it aims to set up naval facilities/outposts in the Indian Ocean region to provide security to its sea lanes of communication, through which it imports large quantities of oil from the Gulf. At the same time, it retains the capability to disrupt similar seaborne trade of India.

Pakistan, despite her internal turmoil, has surprised India by testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on an almost monthly basis. Such tests, apart from providing valuable operating experience, also enables modified equipment to be tested, along with fine-tuning command and control systems. Pakistan, unlike India has a "first strike" policy in case certain thresholds are crossed (Arun Kumar Singh). Unlike India neither the US nor the world body has imposed any controls and conditions on Pakistan or China – India’s two aggressive and unpredictable neighbors.



4) India will need Nuclear Tests : The American labs at Los Alamos and Livermore can draw upon data gathered from some 1,800 atmospheric and underground tests; even the French weaponeers have 217 tests worth of data to rely on. In comparison, Indian weapons designers have data from a sum total of one boosted fission test and one, and that too only partially successful, thermonuclear test, to work with.



Indeed, the dubious quality of advanced Indian weapons is such that the question is not whether India will test again, but when. And specifically, which party or coalition government will have the guts to finally act in defense of national interest and order testing so that this country can acquire proven thermonuclear weapons — the prime currency of power in the new millennium.

If India nevertheless tests — and like it or not, it will have to some time in the coming years — the deal collapses, and sanctions are re-imposed. But this is the situation India is in today. Except, and mark this, two-thirds of her nuclear program is not under safeguards, no light water reactors are imported at exorbitant cost, which money can, more prudently, be invested in the development of thorium reactor technologies at home for real energy security, and fuel supply is not hostage to Nuclear Suppliers’ Group diktat. (Bharat Karnad).

5) India Bound by the Hyde Act and International Inspections in Perpetuity: However inadvertently, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, in one stroke, has deflated New Delhi’s public claims through her unequivocal assurance to Congress that any exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group rules will be "completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act." As Rice put it, "We will support nothing with India in the NSG that is in contradiction to the Hyde Act." What Rice has stated is just a reiteration of what the Hyde Act obligates Washington to do in the NSG — to ensure that the 45-nation, US-led cartel does not in any way dilute the India-directed conditions prescribed by the inherently anti-India Act.

Section 4 of the US draft to the NSG proposed that civil trade with New Delhi be allowed "as long as the participating government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned non-proliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other requirements of the NSG guidelines." One of the commitments specified was for India to indefinitely "continue its moratorium on nuclear testing." Another commitment was for India to embrace international inspections "in perpetuity," leaving no room for corrective measures if India was faced with a Tarapur-style fuel cut-off. (Brahma Chellaney)

6) The 'breadth of facilities' that India has decided to surrender to the so-called international safeguards is shocking as it includes 'fundamental physics and other research institutions'. Research institutions, like the Bhaba Institute of Fundamental Research, should be permanent national institutions and to surrender them permanently to foreign inspection regime cleverly titled as 'safeguards regime' without India’s ability to withdraw is against national interest.

The US nuclear energy program is bifurcated and has come under the safeguards regime only under the following conditions: a) if not used currently for military purposes; b) is not co-located with military-use units; c) is not occasionally used for military purposes; and, d) its inclusion in the safeguards list poses no “incremental risk” to national security. Why should these 4 principles not be applicable to the Indo-US Nuclear Deal as well?

7) Staggering costs of mandated separation of civilian and defense nuclear facilities - by some estimates at $40 billion for separation and another $60 billion for establishing the proposed civilian nuclear sector, along with the impracticality of finding high caliber personnel and equipment for both will effectively shut down the entire nuclear program. Additionally, the opening up of top research institutions to foreign inspections, meddling and potential espionage would hamper and dampen the advanced research. This leads to a suspicion that the real intent of the "Deal" is to strangulate India's technological and industrial emergence. Even in the US, Los Alamos and other strategic labs conduct research on both civilian and military projects. Then why should that standard practice be denied to India?

8) It would be suicidal to accept a moratorium on nuclear research envisaged by the Indo-US Deal - to be sealed by the Accord with IAEA in perpetuity. Opening up some 37 facilities for int’l inspections, including many top scientific institutions could irreparably harm future research. From basic research to weapons-grade plutonium production capability, India’s nascent nuclear deterrent is being delivered a body blow.

The available evidence and supportive materials clearly establish the fact that the fundamental US goal in this Deal is to deter the rise of India as a full-fledged nuclear state that may threaten US global or regional interests. Under the US pressure India has gradually expanded the number of facilities to be placed under the safeguards regime from the initial “one or two”, to 37. With nuclear energy just the bait, the deal has allowed to sharply restrict and cap India’s nuclear weapons program, its fundamental research and consequently its potential rise as an economic power.

9) The Nuclear defense muscle, acquired laboriously and under severe sanctions must not be sacrificed: A permanent moratorium envisaged by the US generated Deal on country's otherwise unrestricted future nuclear research, nuclear defense capabilities and its civilian nuclear energy independence would be suicidal because - the loss of the dependable defense muscle would have the potential of pushing India back in to a state of dependence, subservience and external domination as in the past.


India cannot ignore two ruthless, inimical and unpredictable dictatorships as neighbors. One gobbled up Tibet and now backs Maoists and Naxalites in India to disrupt peace and democracy and the other provides funding, bases and training to Jihadists who have already killed over 75,000 in J&K. The 70 or so people who died horrible deaths on Tuesday, May 13, ‘08 in Jaipur joined the 3,674 Indians who are known to have been killed by a galaxy of terrorists in the 50-month period from January 2004, making India the second worst country after Iraq in terrorist attacks, with their objective to disintegrate and Islamize India. Neither the US nor the int’l community should ignore the fact that India is located on the borders of the epicenter i.e., Pakistan, of the global Islamic terrorism.



Besides possessing the more sophisticated US supplied weapons Pakistan is already working on a nuclear facility capable of producing 40 to 50 plutonium bombs per year.



Less than a month after China's new nuclear submarine base came to light, latest satellite images revealed by international watch groups show that Beijing is upgrading and extending its nuclear missile deployment site that is nearest to India....Experts analyzing the new satellite imagery have identified 58 launch pads, many of which have been added within the last four years. New command and control facilities and missile deployment equipment are also visible at the base (attachment B).



10) Exorbitant costs of the Nuclear Deal : Public deserves to know why the coal powered electric plants that are widely used cannot be built or bought, preferably with clean air technology. The development of such an alternative will be a Swadeshi (indigenous) solution to the problem with no strings attached by any foreign entities and it will eventually enable India to fulfill her power needs from the indigenous Thorium based reactors after some time. The nuclear energy by imported reactors is expected to cost two and a half to three times more than the coal based energy.

In this case India will also be free from the strings of all of the foreign entities. It may be pointed out that at most only some 6% of India’s power needs that too after two decades, are likely to be met from the much publicized nuclear power.

Consider another alternative: The working group on power itself indicated that the potential of hydro power in just India’s northeastern states is 58,000 MW......

Add to this, what can be secured through partnering with Nepal? The current cost of a reactor — a cost that is bound to leap higher, as we shall see — is around $2.5 billion per reactor. For generating the 35,000 MW that the government’s representatives had mentioned in Parliament, New Delhi will have to spend $91 billion. For those mythical 63,000 MW, mentioned by the Planning Commission’s Integrated Energy Policy, India will have to spend $158 billion. Now, the total budget of the government of Nepal is about $1.6 billion. You could offer to defray the entire budget of the Nepalese government for 60 to 100 years, and invite it to jointly build a string of hydro power projects with money raised from the market, and you will still come out better: you would have got power from a perennial, renewable source; you would have alleviated the problem of floods in UP, Bihar and the rest; you would have converted a neighbor into a friend (Arun Shourie).

11) India still doesn’t have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence: Its military asymmetry with China has grown to the extent that many in its policymaking community seem to be losing faith in the country’s ability to defend itself with its own means.

The defense of India is becoming an unending scandal just when new threats are emerging and chinks in the Indian armor are obvious. The Indian Air Force barely inducts the first batch of the British Hawk jet trainer — an obsolescent system in which India invested $1.8 billion ostensibly to help minimize crashes — and a Hawk crashes. No sooner the US had sold India a 1971 vintage amphibious transport ship junked by its navy than a gas leak kills an Indian officer and five sailors on board.....

India has always been let down by its leaders: Today, instead of investing in the rapid development of a credible and comprehensive deterrent, New Delhi acts peculiarly. In an action that ominously harks back to the 1991-95 period when Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister starved the nuclear program of necessary funds for expansion, the government’s just-passed 2008-09 Budget slashes the Department of Atomic Energy’s funding by $529 million. No explanation for this substantial reduction has been offered to the nation.

Instead of securing India’s interests on planet Earth, the government has embarked on a $3.4 billion lunar dream, preparing excitedly to launch the first lunar orbiter. And although current international estimates of India’s weapons-grade fissile material stockpile put its quantity just marginally higher than Pakistan’s, the government has agreed to voluntarily shut down by 2010 one of the country’s two bomb-grade plutonium-production reactors, once the deal with the US goes through. Yet, pulling the wool over public eyes, it says “the deal has no bearing on the strategic program” (Attachment C).


12) Hon'ble Dr. Abdul Kalam, National Leaders, Parliamentarians and patriot citizens: Despite Dr. Kalam’s wishful thinking, on the basis of the facts stated above, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal makes many aspects of the security and foreign policies of India widely and deeply subservient and also in terms of "congruence" with the foreign policy objectives of America. It also shows how little will be India’s energy gains from this accord, either in comparison with India’s needs or with India’s likely gains from other sources, including India’s own. If energy security is what Indians are after, shifting to power dependency on imported technology, reactors, components, uranium, each of which is controlled by an even tighter cartel than oil, is hardly the answer.

The guarantee and durability of national freedom and prosperity requires that India keep all its nuclear options open, just like the other nuclear powers do. This issue must be judged against India's national needs, goals for its future, including the national security and military invincibility and not just for minimal deterrence or meeting fractional electric power needs. Considering nuclear developments around India, there is reason to take Pokhran II to its logical conclusion by putting in place a highly credible deterrent that is alive to changing geo-political realities and not a stagnant doctrine with an irrelevant posture. India has a right and need to maintain its capacity of defending herself in every which way like the US, Russia, China, UK, France etc. with an advanced nuclear capability.

As a result of India’s de- nuclearization by the proposed IAEA Accord and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, should she ever be called upon to make good its threat of retaliation in response to a nuclear provocation or first strike, it may not be in a position to do anything other than make usual bombastic statements and capitulate. A confrontation is now a more probable scenario, in view of the continuing ISI inspired terrorism in India and reports that Pakistan has been diverting the US aid, meant against terrorists in Afghanistan and inside its borders, to strengthening its military muscle against India - possibly for invading and Islamizing her - a centuries old Islamic dream being carried on clandestinely so far.



No nation can be a major power without three attributes: (a) a high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; (b) a capacity to meet basic defense needs indigenously; and (c) a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. With its strategic vision deficit compounded by a leadership deficit, India’s deficiencies in all the three areas are rather nearly alarming.



India must take a firm stand now to preserve her sovereignty, national security, independence in policy making, the national integrity and not allow the Govt., a combination of minority groups, to compromise them. As highlighted earlier, on its finalization the safeguards agreement will become functional and most of India’s dual-use nuclear energy program will come permanently under the UN (IAEA) and indirectly, the US’ supervision, with a potential for espionage and sabotage. Indians could live without nuclear power for some time, but could not risk being subservient to a foreign power. This issue of utmost importance to India’s national security is in your hands. Without your thoughtful indulgence things could get bleak. Please act judiciously now and save India's independence and strengthen her future role as one of the star countries in the community of nations.



Thank you for your time and consideration. We shall look forward to your response.

Sincerely,


Dr. Jagan Kaul
Krishan Bhatnagar
Forum for Secularism and Development (USA)
May 25, 2008

email: krishan.kb@verizon.net



Note: This message will soon be posted on : http://www.nuclearbharat.com/

=====================================



References:



1) N-deal will cripple India ; Satish Chandra, Pioneer, May 20, 2008

2) A decade after May 11, 1998; Kanchan Gupta, Pioneer, May 11, 2008
3) Are we hiding from the Hyde Act? ; Pran Chopra; Asian Age, May 06, 2008

4) Time to rethink policy on strategic deterrence; Arun Kumar Singh ; Asian Age, Apr 21, 2008



5) 'We can live without nuclear power'; Yashwant Sinha; Rediff.com, March 04, 2008

6) Nuclear Test is a must ; Bharat Karnad ; Asian Age, Feb 22, 2008

7) Rice does not Hyde the truth ; Brahma Chellaney, Asian Age, Feb 18, 2008

8) A permanent nuclear hobble ; Bharat Karnad; Asian Age, Dec 14, 2007



9) Necessity is the mother of fabrication too ; Arun Shourie; Indian Express, Dec 11, 2007

10) N-Deal won’t bring power to poor ; S.P. Shukla; Asian Age, Nov 6, 2007

11) Parliament vs PM ; V.P. Singh, India Today, Oct 29, 2007

12) 'Indo-US nuclear deal infringes on our independence' ; Nuclear Scientists;

ia.rediff.com; August 14, 2006



Note: these are posted on http://www.nuclearbharat.com/ for easy reference

==============================



Attachment A



India should go ahead with N-deal: Kalam

IANS
ibnlive.com, May 09, 2008



New Delhi: Former president APJ Abdul Kalam, one of the principal figures behind the May 1998 nuclear tests that shook the world, has said that India should “go ahead” with the civil nuclear deal with the United States as it does not compromise the country's sovereignty.


In a rare interview, Kalam said that if at any time there was a fear that national security would be compromised by going ahead with the deal, “we can at any time withdraw (from it)”.


This was the first time that Kalam, who was among a handful of scientists who were at the nuclear explosion site at Pokhran on May 11 and 13 a decade ago, has spoken out in favour of the deal that has been the subject of so much debate and political controversy in India.



Kalam, who was then chief of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, was feted as a national hero, though the tests drew widespread censure in the rest of the world then.


Ten years later, Kalam – who was later appointed head of state by the government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee – believes the five nuclear tests detonated in the Rajasthan desert was the right decision and said the tests were among the most memorable moments of his career.


http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-should-go-ahead-with-ndeal-kalam/64924-3.html?xml



===================================================



Attachment B

China upgrading N-missile site near India

Tribune News Service
New Delhi, May 17, 2008

Less than a month after China's new nuclear submarine base came to light, latest satellite images revealed by international watch groups show that Beijing is upgrading and extending its nuclear missile deployment site that is nearest to India.

The worry for India could be China's upgrade from liquid to solid fuel for its intermediate missile range to match the AGNI-III that was successfully tested fired by the former about ten days ago. China intermediate missiles have a range between 2,200 km and 3,000 km. The switch from liquid to solid fuel means it will reduce the logistics for China enabling shorter launching time and increasing the chancesof a pre-emptive strike.

China has the longer versions of the inter-continental missiles. But the upgrade of the missiles recently replaced its older generation DF 4 missiles, which needed a two-three hours preparation time before launch, at a base with the newer solid-fuelled DF 21 missiles that can be launched within a few minutes of reaction time.

The images reveal that the Delingha missile base, located 1,900 km northeast of New Delhi in the central province of Qinghai, has recently been upgraded and new missile launch sites have been added at the military facility. The base, complete with extensive underground storage facilities, houses China's DF 21 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) that have a range of over 2,200 km and can target most cities in northern India and southern Russia. New Delhi has been keeping the base -- built in the late 1970s -- under regular surveillance.

Experts analysing the new satellite imagery have identified 58 launch pads, many of which have been added within the last four years. New command and control facilities and missile deployment equipment are also visible at the base.

While the upgraded base does not change the situation much for India -- it has been within the reach of Chinese nuclear missiles for years. China appears to be building/ upgrading launch pads in the area, but that is to escape the US and Russian counterforce targeting. India is still many years away from a counterforce capability, experts believe.


While the base was built in the 1970's when Russia was a major military threat to China, experts say that the missiles deployed there are likely to be targeted only against threats from India and Russia. Other traditional rivals, like Japan, Taiwan and the US are out of reach from the base.



http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080518/nation.htm#4



===================================================

Attachment C



India, a decade after gatecrashing the nuclear club



Up, up and frittered away

Brahma Chellaney
Hindustan Times; May 08, 2008

As the country observes this Sunday the 10th anniversary of the nuclear tests that enabled it to gatecrash the nuclear-weapons club, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still chanting the disarmament mantra while conspicuously lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China. Given that the 1998 tests' anniversary also coincides with the 34th anniversary of Pokhran I, it is important to remember that no country has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than India.


The history of India’s nuclear explosive programme is actually a record of how it helped mould multilateral technology controls. The 1974 detonation impelled the secret formation of the London suppliers’ club, the reshaping of the non-proliferation regime, and export bans on dual-use items. The test helped remake US policy, spurring major reforms in export policy, the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the attachment of non-proliferation conditions to foreign assistance, and the emergence of the sanctions approach. India’s space programme helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control Regime.


Had India done a test in the mid-1960s when it acquired the nuclear explosive capability, it would have beaten the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) trap. Had Indira Gandhi pressed ahead with weaponisation after Pokhran I, India would not have faced a rising tide of technology sanctions. Had Atal Bihari Vajpayee dangled a test moratorium as a diplomatic carrot post-Pokhran II, instead of gifting it away gratuitously, the US would have hesitated to slap an array of new sanctions on India. And had Manmohan Singh sought to plug the yawning gaps in capability, instead of pushing a divisive deal with the US that offers dubious energy benefits to insidiously neuter India’s deterrent, a more-confident New Delhi today would not have had to propitiate China or any other power.


India has always been let down by its leaders. The more India got hit with technology controls, the more it sank into its proverbial indecision, instead of doggedly pressing ahead. Almost a quarter century passed between Pokhran I and II, as a stock-still India masochistically put up with punitive actions. A decade after Pokhran II, the present leadership is more interested in deal-making than deterrent-building. Exactly 25 years after the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was launched, New Delhi has announced its mysterious closure — without a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment, and even as Pakistan has conducted countless missile tests since last year.


While China ploughs 28 per cent of its mammoth, rapidly growing military spending into defence R&D, geared to modernising its deterrent, India’s total annual budget outlays for the nuclear deterrent make up less than one-tenth of the just-announced $11 billion quarterly profit of one US company, Exxon-Mobil. Yet, India does not shy away from squandering several billion dollars annually in importing questionable conventional weapons. Consider some recent examples.


The Indian Air Force barely inducts the first batch of the British Hawk jet trainer — an obsolescent system in which India invested $1.8 billion ostensibly to help minimise crashes — and a Hawk crashes. No sooner the US had sold India a 1971 vintage amphibious transport ship junked by its navy than a gas leak kills an Indian officer and five sailors on board. The Defence Minister now discloses, nine months after the delivery date has passed, that Russia wants $1.2 billion more and another three years to deliver a refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier that India had agreed to buy for $1.5 billion in early 2004, although it had been rusting since a mid-1990s boiler-room explosion.
Is India seeking to build a first-rate military with strategic reach and an independent deterrent, or a military that will remain irredeemably dependent on imports and serve as a money-spinning dumping ground for antiquated and junked weapons?



The defence of India is becoming an unending scandal just when new threats are emerging and chinks in the Indian armour are obvious. Even CAG indictments make little difference.


In peacetime, China is stepping up military pressure along the Himalayas, intimidating India through intermittent cyberwarfare, and warning of another 1962-style invasion through one of its State-run institutes, which in a Mandarin commentary posted on http://www.chinaiiss.org/ has cautioned an “arrogant India” not “to be evil” or else Chinese forces in war “will not pull back 30 kilometres” like in 1962. If China actually sets out to “teach India a lesson”, as it did in 1962 by its own admission, to whom will New Delhi turn? In 1962, despite Jawaharlal Nehru’s two frantic letters to John F. Kennedy, US arms arrived after the Chinese aggression had ceased and a weakened India had been made to agree to open Kashmir talks with Pakistan.


Today, instead of investing in the rapid development of a credible and comprehensive deterrent, New Delhi acts peculiarly. In an action that ominously harks back to the 1991-95 period when Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister starved the nuclear programme of necessary funds for expansion, the government’s just-passed 2008-09 Budget slashes the Department of Atomic Energy’s funding by $529 million. No explanation has been offered to the nation.


Rather than aim for a technological leap through a crash ICBM (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile) programme, India remains stuck in the IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) arena, where its frog-like paces have taken it — nearly two decades after the first Agni test — to Agni-III, a non-strategic missile in deterrence argot.



Instead of securing India’s interests on planet Earth, the government has embarked on a $3.4 billion lunar dream, preparing excitedly to launch the first lunar orbiter. And although current international estimates of India’s weapons-grade fissile material stockpile put its quantity just marginally higher than Pakistan’s, the government has agreed to voluntarily shut down by 2010 one of the country’s two bomb-grade plutonium-production reactors, once the deal with the US goes through. Yet, pulling the wool over public eyes, it says “the deal has no bearing on the strategic programme”.


No nation can be a major power without three attributes: (i) a high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; (ii) a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and (iii) a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. With its strategic vision deficit compounded by a leadership deficit, India’s deficiencies in all the three areas are no secret.


By disproving the prophets of doom and launching the country on a rising trajectory, Pokhran II was supposed to lift India from its subaltern mindset and help focus its energies on capability-building. Critics like Manmohan Singh had warned the tests would seriously impair the economy. But India’s foreign exchange reserves multiplied five times in seven years and its GDP growth accelerated sharply. Who looked at India as a rising power before 1998? Pokhran II thus was a watershed.
A decade later, however, India doesn’t have much to celebrate. Nuclear diffidence continues to hold it down. It still doesn’t have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence.



Its military asymmetry with China has grown to the extent that many in its policymaking community seem to be losing faith in the country’s ability to defend itself with its own means. Tellingly, the government has no major celebration planned for the decadal anniversary.


Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research.


http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/

__._,_.___